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Introduction
The rapid growth in carbon disclosure in recent years represents a major success in the struggle to
build awareness and action on climate change. Despite the Copenhagen debacle and Congressional
inaction in the US, the measurement and reporting of carbon emissions at the product, facility and
organization levels display considerable momentum. The growth of carbon disclosure is the result
of three core drivers: regulatory compliance, pressure from non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and managerial information systems intended to facilitate participation in carbon markets,
reduce energy costs and manage reputational risks. In this essay, we argue that the strategies
pursued by ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ have played a key role in the successful institutionalization
of carbon disclosure by bringing together companies, NGOs and government agencies. The Carbon
Disclosure Project (CDP), in particular, has displayed strategic skill in presenting the project in
ways that appeal to multiple stakeholders and building broad legitimacy for reporting standards.
Some 3000 organizations in 66 countries around the world now measure and disclose their
emissions and climate strategies through CDP (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010). Carbon disclosure
has become an important institution of governance, raising awareness about climate change, clean
energy and energy efficiency, and generating legitimacy for the principle of external accountability.
Most importantly, the rise of voluntary carbon disclosure has demonstrated to business the feasibility
and potential benefits of carbon measurement and reporting, such as management of reputation
and energy costs. In turn, this has opened political space for regulatory initiatives that mandate
disclosure and formalize carbon accounting standards.
Despite the rapid uptake of carbon disclosure, there are some troubling questions about the
trajectory along which the institution is evolving and its ultimate impact. Tensions exist between
two ‘institutional logics’, a corporate logic of carbon risk management and carbon trading, and an
NGO-oriented logic based on transparency and accountability. We argue that the field is drifting
toward a more corporate logic, and that while this enhances the diffusion of disclosure, it also
weakens it as a tool for driving the substantial cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions needed to
address climate change. Our analysis also highlights that building new institutions requires not just
discursive strategies to frame issues in a particular way, but also political and economic strategies
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to construct an organizational coalition and a ‘business model’ for the new institution (Knox-Hayes,
2010b; Levy and Scully, 2007).

Carbon disclosure as governance
Carbon disclosure can be understood as an emerging institution that provides field-level governance in the broad sense of the term, as a multi-level, multi-actor system of rules, norms and
standards that structure and constrain a field of action (Mol, 2008; Utting, 2002). Levy and Newell
(2006) have also emphasized the role of markets and corporate decisions regarding operations and
strategies as important aspects of governance. Carbon disclosure plays a role in three modes of
governance; regulatory compliance, carbon trading and management and civil regulation through
accountability and transparency.
First, carbon disclosure is critical for regulatory compliance. In 2009, the US EPA issued a
requirement that large emitters start reporting their greenhouse gas emissions. Companies subject
to mandatory cap-and-trade programs need to measure their carbon emissions in order to ensure
compliance. In early 2010, the US SEC issued new guidance recommending comprehensive
disclosure of ‘material risks’, listing considerations such as the impact of climate change regulation
and international accords, the consequences of legal, technical, political and scientific developments, and the physical impacts of climate change.
Second, carbon information is integral to carbon markets and corporate carbon management.
Carbon markets are emerging as a key form of governance, imposing emission caps and putting a
price on carbon. Indeed, carbon as an intangible tradable commodity is constructed purely from
specific informational protocols, necessitating the development of carbon accounting systems
(Knox-Hayes, 2010a). Companies can also engage in voluntary carbon markets, for example,
investing in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in developing countries. Financial
companies engaged in carbon trading and consulting companies such as Point Carbon are also
intensive consumers and producers of carbon information at a more aggregate level.
Many firms are implementing carbon management systems, sometimes as modules linked to
their systems for accounting and logistics control. One key driver is the prospect of improving
internal efficiencies to reduce energy costs and calculate carbon footprints at the product level.
Increasingly, powerful firms are pushing their suppliers to engage in carbon accounting for product
labeling and cost control purposes. While already well underway among major European retailers
such as Tesco, Wal-Mart surprised its 80,000 strong supplier base with an initiative announced in
June 2009 to provide an environmental impact label for every product on its shelves.
A third way in which carbon disclosure operates as governance is to exert pressure on organizations for accountability and transparency. This pressure, which Murphy and Bendell (1999) term
‘civil regulation’, primarily originates from NGOs. The institutionalization of standardized information reporting systems, such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the CDP, enables NGOs to
undertake benchmarking and demand certain performance levels. Carbon disclosure also improves
accountability to investors. A governmental energy agency director1 observed:
Most of these companies are starting to provide very substantial analysis over the financial risk that climate
change represents. The financial community will be very focused on figuring out which companies are
threatened by climate legislation, what type of exposure, and how does that affect prospective investment.
(Executive director, governmental energy association, Washington, DC, 29 November 2007)

The CDP is a non-profit UK-based organization that sends an annual questionnaire to companies
on topics including GHG emissions, climate-related risks and opportunities, and management

Knox-Hayes and Levy

3

programs and procedures. The core strategy for CDP has been to recruit institutional investors
who in turn would pressure companies in which they invest for carbon disclosure. This strategy
leverages disclosure to investors to pursue a broader civil accountability agenda. By 2009, CDP
had signed up 475 investors with a total US$55 trillion under management.
Each of these modes of disclosure-based governance is associated with actors whose interests
diverge to some degree. Government agencies seek compliance, reporting companies and their
investors want to manage energy costs and carbon risks, while NGOs seek civil regulation and
transparency. The three governance modes overlap to some extent; for example, carbon information for market creation also serves regulatory compliance. Similarly, carbon information for
accountability and transparency can also assist asset valuation for investors. The different modes,
however, rely on information formats that differ in their detail and emphasis, creating tensions
and competition for influence over the reporting protocols.
Advocates of carbon disclosure recognized early on the need for common standards, but the
details have a critical impact on the shape of the carbon governance system and whose interests
are served. Crucially, the institutionalization of carbon reporting relies on a successful project of
‘commensuration’, defined by Levin and Espeland (2002: 121) as ‘the transformation of qualitative relations into quantities on a common metric’. Just as financial reporting translates myriad
activities into a common monetary metric, so carbon reporting renders complex operations involving multiple gases, sources and impacts into a common carbon metric, tCO2e (tonnes of carbon
dioxide equivalent). The commodification of carbon is a political project, requiring an extensive
organizational infrastructure to define carbon units, allocate property rights and establish rules
for trading (Knox-Hayes, 2009). One interviewee suggested that reconciling carbon products in
different regions requires standardized disclosure:
We think about what kind of products are fungible on a regional basis – and what risk management tools
are needed. This drives the development of products and demand for disclosure. (Vice president, exchange,
New York, 8 November 2007)

These are not just technical, but also political questions. For example, the CO2 produced by
driving cars could be attributed to oil producers, refiners, the car manufacturer, or the final
consumer. The release of a draft GHG Protocol in December 2009 for Scope 3 (activities upstream
and downstream of the value chain) emissions generated considerable concern in the business
community. While it was simple to agree, in principle, that carbon disclosure was a good idea, the
devil is in the detail. Companies are apprehensive at the complexity and costs, and at the implicit
principle that they are responsible for emissions beyond their direct control. For one thing, companies often report on their home country or main markets, but are unsure of how to report global
operations or data for the full range of business units. Second, the world’s largest polluters have
the expertise to conduct Scope 3 reporting in-house, while smaller companies likely do not have
the necessary resources or expertise (Balch, 2009).

Actors’ strategies to promote carbon disclosure
The creation of new institutions such as carbon disclosure is facilitated by the agency of institutional entrepreneurs (Lawrence et al., 2009; Wijen and Ansari, 2007), whose strategies align
cognitive frames and material interests in ways that structure networks of organizations into a
coherent field. Though institutions are increasingly seen as primarily symbolic, discursive constructions (Phillips et al., 2004), here we follow Levy and Scully (2007) and posit that stable
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institutions, and the strategies pursued to construct them, have mutually reinforcing discursive,
material and organizational elements.
Notably, NGO advocates for carbon disclosure did not just focus on their own agenda of corporate accountability and reducing emissions, but also appealed to the interests of business, investors
and governmental agencies. CDP framed carbon disclosure as ‘win-win’, satisfying environmental,
social and economic goals. Carbon disclosure was described as analogous to financial accounting
and an extension of corporate social and environmental reporting, activities which already have
widespread legitimacy, clear authority structures and recognized benefits for multiple groups. For
business audiences, CDP emphasized the potential financial benefits from energy savings and good
public relations, and the voluntary nature of disclosure, which provides flexible implementation
with little legal exposure. Investors were enticed with the claim that carbon disclosure would assist
in valuing financial assets by revealing the degree of climate risk.
To appeal to NGOs and multilateral organizations such as UNEP, the emphasis was placed on
improving corporate accountability and creating more inclusive and transparent governance
mechanisms. The CDP was designed, like the Global Reporting Initiative, to provide a standardized
format that would enable comparison across firms, rewarding strong performers with reputational
benefits while pressuring non-disclosers and poor performers (Florini, 2003). In a similar way, the
mandatory disclosure of Toxic Release Inventory data in the USA is widely viewed as a successful
example of information-based governance (Graham, 2002).
As with other reporting initiatives, the CDP strove for broad legitimacy among multiple
stakeholders. The director of a carbon accounting initiative explained:
Our goal is to design, disseminate and promote the use of an internationally accepted protocol for
measuring and reporting entity level emissions. We want to achieve international acceptance, widespread
adoption, use and endorsement. (Director, environmental NGO, London, 23 September 2008)

In order to get buy-in from these diverse groups, and in the absence of any governmental initiative,
the development of reporting standards was undertaken privately as a joint project of the World
Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. More
recently, CDP has collaborated with the accounting firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC). Though
these efforts have succeeded in generating a set of widely accepted protocols, tensions have
emerged that a private, voluntary initiative has difficulty in resolving:
In the WRI group we brought in academics, people from the industry and environment. … The real
challenge with the WRI protocol and ISO 14000 is that the devil is always in the details. The protocol and
ISO standard are difficult documents and need to spell out in more detail how to apply to specific project
types in particular geographies. … There needs to be a regulator that sets the standard. Our institution is
playing a quasi regulatory role, but it is a question of how long the voluntary markets can sustain
themselves. (Vice president of policy, registry, Los Angeles, 27 August 2008)

Tensions in the carbon governance system
The difficulties in the development of specific reporting protocols reflect more fundamental tensions between competing sets of assumptions, goals and practices, or ‘institutional logics’. The logic
of ‘civil regulation’ views carbon disclosure as primarily a mechanism to empower environmental
groups to play a more assertive role in corporate governance, increasing the transparency and
accountability of corporations, and pressuring firms to reduce emissions. The logic of ‘corporate
environmental performance’, by contrast, signifies the instrumental value of carbon disclosure to
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business through the management of energy costs and risks, and facilitation of carbon trading.
CDP strategies had helped manage these tensions, but without entirely resolving them.
CDP’s roots in the logic of civil regulation are evident in the data format and in strategic parallels
with the Global Reporting Initiative, which was launched by the environmental NGO Ceres (Levy
et al., 2010). CDP reports provide aggregate carbon emissions data at the organizational level, a
format geared toward external audiences, primarily NGOs. Although investors have signed up in
large numbers to the initiative, which provides good publicity at little cost, a common complaint is
that the data are not sufficiently detailed for assessing carbon risk and valuing assets. In a recent
report, Rory Sullivan, the head of Insight Investment, suggests that while ‘the CDP has done a
really good and important job of encouraging companies to report – the question is whether that is
enough? The CDP’s assumption is that by getting companies to disclose you will trigger change in
the investment community and the answer is that hasn’t happened’ (ENDS, 2008). Indeed, a
survey commissioned by Ceres (2010) found that few asset managers include climate risks and
opportunities in their investment analysis. Sullivan contends that ‘signing up to the CDP allows
investors to tick the box on climate change’, but many of these investors do not consider climate
change to be a material risk over the short periods in which they invest (ENDS, 2008). Another
investment analyst remarked that ‘initiatives like the CDP are mostly inconsequential when it
comes to where investment dollars ultimately flow. … The problem with the CDP is that it’s really
an activist organization parading as an investor group.’2
Paradoxically, CDP information is not very useful for NGO campaigns either, on account of the
conflicting purposes of the information and compromises made to gain corporate acceptance.
Emily Farnworth from the Climate Group, an NGO that promotes low-carbon energy policies, has
suggested that CDP ‘data is patchy and inconsistent, with only half [of reporting companies]
using internationally recognized standards for reporting’ (Farnworth, 2007). On the one hand, the
CDP has strived to increase the standardization of reporting in successive versions of its survey, in
order to facilitate comparisons across firms and sectors, but these aggregate level data are hard to
interpret. On the other hand, it has attempted to cope with the complexity and diversity of reporting
companies with more detailed sector-specific sections and questions inviting more qualitative
responses, where firms can use a narrative style to describe various carbon-related strategies and
initiatives. These more detailed and qualitative data are not directly comparable across companies
or sectors.

Evolution of carbon disclosure and its limitations
The institutional development of carbon disclosure is a dynamic process, whose path reflects the
outcome of strategic interactions between NGOs, business and government agencies in a particular
economic, social and political context. The strategic compromises and fragile coalitions necessary
to undertake institutional entrepreneurship and initiate field-level change inherently generate
pressures that inhibit and circumscribe more systematic field transformation. In this case, CDP’s
strategy of positioning carbon disclosure as integral to carbon markets and management has
helped carbon disclosure gain mainstream acceptance but also resulted in the dominance of an
institutional logic based on market-oriented managerialism.
The evolution of carbon disclosure demonstrates the importance of establishing a viable institutional ‘business model’. It is one thing to launch a new initiative with a ‘win-win’ discursive framing
that promises benefits for all; institutional stabilization, however, requires a functioning economic
circuit that provides material resources for participating organizations, reinforcing the symbolic
dimensions of the institution. CDP is beginning to falter because it is not living up to expectations
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regarding its value for external stakeholders. Investors remain unconvinced that carbon information
is valuable in the pricing of financial assets and NGOs are not finding the data to be particularly
useful in their campaigns. As a result, corporate managers are expressing some doubts about the
value of investing in external disclosure in the absence of an audience (Farnworth, 2007).
The institution of carbon measurement and reporting is still growing, but the center of gravity
is shifting. Business is increasingly interested in internal carbon information systems useful for
measuring and managing GHG emissions at the facility, process, or product level. Data needs for
regulatory compliance are also growing. Point Carbon, a consulting firm, estimates that 4.2 billion
tonnes of CO2 (and equivalents) were traded globally in 2008, with a value approaching US$100
billion (Point Carbon, 2008). Carbon disclosure therefore holds the most potential value for corporate managers and software companies. In the last couple of years, most large accounting, law
and management consultancy firms have set up carbon and clean energy practices. For these firms,
carbon measurement, management and reporting, and the analysis of carbon markets, present a
vast new market opportunity.
While reporting rates through CDP are reaching a plateau, there is a rapidly growing market for
corporate carbon management systems that attempt to cover multiple purposes. The London-based
consulting company Verdantix recently released a proprietary report on carbon management
software,3 which notes that ‘Many Board members would be horrified at the low quality and poor
verification of carbon emissions data that is released into the public domain through channels like
the Carbon Disclosure Project.’ A recent spate of acquisitions demonstrates the spike of interest in
this area: in 2009, for example, the giant software company SAP, which offers accounting and supply chain management modules, bought carbon software startup Clear Standards. These software
packages aggregate emissions data from multiple sources across a company and integrate carbon
price projections for planning purposes.

Conclusions
The evolution of carbon disclosure invites a critical assessment of its possibilities and limitations
as a mode of governance. First, how does carbon disclosure operate as a process, in terms of the
influence and interests of various actors? Second, is it effective at achieving the environmental
goal of reducing emissions? The business and financial actors who thrive most directly from
carbon financialization and disclosure hold a privileged position in the field of carbon governance,
and enjoy increasing influence in structuring carbon reporting standards and information systems
(Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). This ensures that powerful interests will continue to drive the
growth and broad institutionalization of carbon disclosure. Yet it also raises some significant
concerns. Carbon protocols and reporting formats are likely to evolve to reflect these actors’ perspectives and interests, which could undermine their effectiveness in various ways. For example,
controlling energy costs at the firm level does not map perfectly with GHG emission control
across the whole value chain and life cycle. Reporting systems geared toward carbon trading,
compliance and external sustainability reporting are unlikely to drive more radical restructuring of
core product strategies.
More fundamentally, a carbon disclosure system dominated by business and finance exemplifies
Barley’s (2007) concern regarding the ‘privatization of functions that have historically been the
mandate of local, state, and federal governments’. Barley warned that ‘people are now separated
from their representatives by an asteroid belt of organizations, and among the most powerful of
these are corporations and their trade associations’. The implication in the climate context is that
political pressures on companies for dramatic emission reductions will be weakened. Rather than
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being constrained by carbon disclosure, companies increasingly play a role in structuring the
governance system, interposing themselves between our collective interest in environmental stability and government responsibilities
A major limitation of voluntary disclosure systems is the focus on managerial process, the
lack of comparability across firms and the lack of sanctions for non-compliance (Gupta, 2008;
Mason, 2008). In the absence of a significant carbon price, with consumers who are apathetic
or confused, and investors unsure about the relevance of carbon information, carbon disclosure
systems do not necessarily translate into substantial reductions. This is acknowledged in a 2010
CDP report that pointed to a ‘carbon chasm’ between national targets of GHG reductions between
15 and 30 percent by 2020, and the carbon commitments of the S&P100, the 100 largest companies based in the US, which average an increase of about 4 percent over the same time period.
Given these challenges, it is fair to say that carbon disclosure has reached a strategic inflection
point and is in need of critical reassessment. As the field shifts from an NGO-oriented logic,
which emphasizes transparency and accountability, toward a corporate logic that enhances managerial control, there is a pressing question of the underlying merits of carbon disclosure and its
effectiveness as a system of governance.
These conclusions bear important implications for the various actors involved in carbon disclosure, though their different objectives mean there is no single set of recommendations. A common
thread for all actors is the crucial importance of gaining a deep understanding of the complexities
of the field in order to develop effective discursive, economic and political strategies. For NGOs
interested in furthering the goals of corporate accountability and reducing emissions, it is crucial
to be cognizant of the longer-term effects of relying on reporting companies and the financial
sector to advance carbon disclosure. In order to maintain a balanced coalition, it is therefore important to maintain close links with key allies, such as environmentalists, labor and community organizations, to ensure that carbon disclosure is valuable for these groups. At same time, disclosure
has to be sufficiently detailed and relevant for investors, as well as meeting compliance needs.
These competing demands certainly require considerable strategic and technical skills. Recognizing
the weaknesses of a voluntary approach, a longer-term strategy could well entail leveraging the
legitimacy of disclosure toward a mandatory reporting system.
Similarly, policy-makers cannot abnegate responsibility for long-term limitations on greenhouse gas emissions, and need to consider how to use carbon disclosure as part of a broader
multi-pronged strategy that offers a real promise of economic gains through carbon management
and acknowledges corporate need for streamlined reporting and common standards. For business
managers, on the assumption that climate and rising energy prices remain long-term drivers, they
face the challenge of developing information systems that meet multiple needs, from aggregate
data needed for compliance, trading and external reporting, to the detailed data at the product
and process levels that can drive reductions in emissions and fuel use. This presents a major
opportunity for accounting and software companies.
The evolution of carbon disclosure also presents interesting avenues for future research. Our
understanding of the dynamic and strategic dimensions of developing new institutions, or reshaping existing ones, is still quite rudimentary, and could benefit from connecting with the strategy
literature, particularly streams relating to political strategy, collaborations and alliances. Future
work could probe the interaction of the various actors and their strategies, in order to gain better
insight into the conditions under which new institutions such as carbon disclosure might emerge
and stabilize. The carbon disclosure case also highlights the importance of examining how institutions evolve over time, the shifting coalitions and logics behind them, and whether they are to
remain effective in achieving their broader societal goals.
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Notes
1. The quotes presented in the essay are from an NSF funded (0802799) study conducted by Janelle
Knox-Hayes from 2007 to 2009. The study analyzed the institutional development of carbon emissions
markets in the US and Europe. As part of the study, a number of agents in organizations that build and
operationalize the carbon markets were interviewed including individuals at banks, brokerages, legal
firms, exchanges, wire services and NGOs. All interlocutors were guaranteed anonymity; therefore,
specific names are not listed, but rather firm type as well as the individual’s position.
2. At: seekingalpha.com/article/163306-climate-change-and-corporate-disclosure-should-investors-care.
3. At: www.pressreleasepoint.com/verdantix-says-cfos-will-be-compelled-invest-carbon-managementsoftware.
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